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1153 
Professor Margaret Berger, the 
Epitome of the Fully Engaged Scholar 
and Friend of the Court 
Edward J. Imwinkelried† 
Today’s law professors are no longer content to remain 
in the “ivory tower.” Rather, they aspire to be fully engaged in 
the process of law reform. They not only hope that their 
scholarship will be creative and theoretically sound; they also 
want it to have real world impact. Margaret Berger’s scholarly 
career is a model for any academic who entertains that 
aspiration. 
To be sure, Professor Berger is a prominent figure 
within the “ivory tower.” For decades, she has been a coauthor 
of one of the leading evidence casebooks, Evidence: Cases and 
Materials, with Judge Weinstein and Professors Mansfield and 
Abrams.1 Moreover, she has published widely cited articles in 
many of the most highly regarded law reviews.2 
However, her influence extends far beyond the world of 
legal education. Law reform organizations have often turned to 
her for guidance and insight. She has been a member of several 
National Academy of Sciences committees, including the 
Committee on DNA Technology in Forensic Science. She was 
the Reporter for the Post-Conviction Issues Working Group of 
the National Commission on the Future of DNA Evidence. The 
  
 † Edward L. Barrett, Jr. Professor of Law, University of California Davis. 
 1 JACK B. WEINSTEIN, JOHN H. MANSFIELD, NORMAN ABRAMS & MARGARET 
A. BERGER, EVIDENCE: CASES AND MATERIALS (9th ed. 1997). 
 2 A small sample includes: Margaret A. Berger & Aaron D. Twerski, From 
the Wrong End of the Telescope: A Response to Professor David Bernstein, 104 MICH. L. 
REV. 1983 (2006); Margaret A. Berger & Aaron D. Twerski, Uncertainty and Informed 
Choice: Unmasking Daubert, 104 MICH. L. REV. 257 (2005); Margaret A. Berger, 
Eliminating General Causation: Notes Towards a New Theory of Justice and Toxic 
Torts, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2117 (1997); Margaret A. Berger, Procedural Paradigms for 
Applying the Daubert Test, 78 MINN. L. REV. 1345 (1994) [hereinafter Berger, 
Procedural Paradigms for Applying the Daubert Test]; Margaret A. Berger, The 
Deconstitutionalization of the Confrontation Clause: A Proposal for a Prosecutorial 
Restraint Model, 76 MINN. L. REV. 557 (1992); Margaret A. Berger, A Relevancy 
Approach to Novel Scientific Evidence, 26 JURIMETRICS J. 245 (1986).  
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prestigious Carnegie Commission on Science, Technology, and 
Government has also called on her as a consultant.  
For its part, the practicing bar pays special attention to 
Professor Berger’s writing. She is the coauthor of the foremost 
treatise on federal evidence law, Weinstein’s Federal Evidence: 
Commentary on Rules of Evidence for the United States Courts 
and Magistrates.3 I teach Trial Practice. I devote one class 
session to evidentiary objections. In that session, I discuss the 
question of which secondary authorities the trial attorney 
should cite to the judge. I have told literally thousands of 
students that when you have time at sidebar to cite only one 
authority to a federal judge, that authority should be 
Weinstein’s Evidence. It undeniably carries more weight with 
sitting federal District Court judges than any other treatise or 
text.  
Judges not only have a high regard for Professor 
Berger’s contributions to the Weinstein treatise; she has 
published other works that are typically at the fingertips of 
federal judges. After the Supreme Court handed down its 
decision in Daubert,4 the Federal Judicial Center decided that it 
needed to provide the federal judiciary with research tools to 
help judges deal more knowledgeably with scientific issues. The 
center has released two editions of its celebrated Reference 
Manual on Scientific Evidence.5 Every federal District Court 
judge in the United States has that text either on the bench or 
in chambers. Professor Berger contributed substantial articles 
to both editions. In the first edition, she authored “Evidentiary 
Framework,”6 which gave judges an overview of the impact of 
Daubert. The second edition includes her article, “The Supreme 
Court’s Trilogy on the Admissibility of Expert Testimony.”7 
That article not only contains further perspective on the 
original Daubert decision; the article adds a discussion of 
Daubert’s progeny, Joiner8 and Kumho.9 It was expectable that 
  
 3 Jack B. Weinstein & Margaret A. Berger, Weinstein’s Federal Evidence: 
Commentary on Rules of Evidence for the United States Courts and Magistrates (2nd 
ed., 1997). 
 4 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
 5 FED. JUDICIAL CTR., REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE (1994); 
FED. JUDICIAL CTR., REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE (2d ed. 2000). 
 6 Margaret A. Berger, Evidentiary Framework, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON 
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE (1994), supra note 5, at 37. 
 7 Margaret A. Berger, The Supreme Court’s Trilogy on the Admissibility of 
Expert Testimony, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE (2d ed. 2000), 
supra note 5, at 9. 
 8 Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997). 
2010] FRIEND OF THE COURT 1155 
when the Judicial Conference reconstituted the Advisory 
Committee on the Federal Rules of Evidence, Professor Berger 
was named the first Reporter for the committee.  
These facts give a sense of the extent of Professor 
Berger’s influence. However, in this article I would like to focus 
on the considerable influence she has had as a friend of the 
Court—as the author of amicus briefs submitted to the United 
States Supreme Court. During her long career, Professor 
Berger has submitted a large number of amicus briefs in cases 
pending before the Court.10 However, two amicus briefs are 
especially noteworthy, namely, her amicus briefs in the original 
Daubert litigation11 and her brief in the subsequent Kumho 
case.12 A careful comparison of the contents of Professor 
Berger’s briefs in those cases and the Court’s ultimate opinions 
reveals the remarkable degree to which Professor Berger’s 
arguments seemingly influenced the Court’s ruling and 
reasoning in both decisions. 
I. PROFESSOR BERGER’S AMICUS BRIEF IN DAUBERT 
In 1992, Professor Berger was the lead author of an 
amicus brief in Daubert on behalf of the Carnegie Commission 
on Science, Technology, and Government.13 In the long term, 
one of the most important passages in Daubert will prove to be 
Justice Blackmun’s observation that “arguably, there are no 
certainties in science.”14 Prior to Daubert, many courts had 
  
 9 Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).  
 10 See, e.g., Motion for Leave to File and Brief Amicus Curiae of the Am. Civil 
Liberties Union and the ACLU Of Va., in Support Of Petitioner, Lilly v. Virginia, 527 
U.S. 116 (1999) (No. 98-5881), 1998 WL 901782 (with Professor Richard Friedman of 
the University of Michigan School of Law); Brief of Law Professors Paul F. Rothstein, 
Ronald J. Allen, Margaret A. Berger et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of the Petitioner, 
Office of the President v. Office of Independent Counsel, 521 U.S. 1105 (1997) (No. 96-
1783), 1997 WL 33549611; Brief of the American Civil Liberties Union as Amicus 
Curiae in Support of the Respondent, Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 (1990) (No. 89-
260), 1989 WL 1127312; Brief of Margaret A. Berger and Jerome Kassirer as Amici 
Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellants, Sidharath v. Sandoz Pharmaceuticals Corp. 
(11th Cir. 2001).  
 11 Brief of the Carnegie Commission on Science, Technology, and Government 
as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 
509 U.S. 579 (1993) (No. 92-102), 1992 WL 12006530 [hereinafter Daubert Amicus 
Brief].  
 12 Brief of Margaret A. Berger, Edward J. Imwinkelried & Stephen A. 
Saltzburg as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 
536 U.S. 127 (1999) (No. 97-1709), 1998 WL 762013 [hereinafter Kumho Amicus Brief].  
 13 Daubert Amicus Brief, supra note 11.  
 14 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590 (1993). 
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subscribed to the naïve belief that at least the “exact” sciences 
could yield absolutely certain conclusions.15 Justice Blackmun 
shattered that naïveté in Daubert. In her amicus brief in 
Daubert, Professor Berger had urged the Court to do precisely 
that. She noted that in the past, the courts had “assume[d] that 
there is much more definiteness in science than actually 
exists.”16 As she described the scientific process, even in fields 
such as physics and chemistry the experimental/observational 
methodology yields only “contingent,”17 “provisional”18 
conclusions. Since it is always conceivable that a subsequent 
experiment will falsify a hypothesis supported by earlier 
experiments, scientific investigators cannot lay claim to “final 
or permanent” truth.19 
In large part, the Court agreed with Professor Berger’s 
position because the Court embraced her conception of the 
scientific process itself. The brief repeatedly described the 
essence of the scientific method as the “formulati[on] [of] 
hypotheses”20 and “[r]igor[ous] . . . testing of [the] hypotheses”21 
to validate or falsify them.22 Justice Blackmun’s description of 
the scientific method in his lead opinion in Daubert is 
strikingly similar: “a process for proposing and refining 
theoretical explanations about the world that are subject to 
further testing and refinement.”23 
The Daubert Court drew a number of doctrinal 
implications from its conclusions about the nature of the 
scientific enterprise—the very implications that Professor 
Berger identified in her amicus brief. First, Justice Blackmun 
abandoned the traditional general acceptance test for the 
admissibility of scientific testimony.24 The Justice characterized 
  
 15 Edward J. Imwinkelried, Evidence Law Visits Jurassic Park: The Far-
Reaching Implication of the Daubert Court’s Recognition of the Uncertainty of the 
Scientific Enterprise, 81 IOWA L. REV. 55, 59-60 (1995). 
 16 Daubert Amicus Brief, supra note 11, at *9. 
 17 Id. at *5. 
 18 Id. at *9. 
 19 Id. at *4.  
 20 Id. 
 21 Id.  
 22 See id. (“how science is conducted”); id. at *8 (“an extensive examination of 
the hypotheses being put forth”); id. at *10 (“the process by which the theory was 
generated or tested”).  
 23 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590 (1993) (emphasis 
omitted) (quoting Brief for the Am. Assoc. for the Advancement of Sci. and the Nat’l 
Acad. of Sci. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 7-8, Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharm. Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (No. 92-102), 2003 WL 13006281). 
 24 See id. at 587-89. 
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the test as too “austere [a] standard.”25 He criticized the test as 
being “at odds with the ‘liberal thrust’ of the Federal Rules [of 
Evidence].”26 In her brief, Professor Berger had asserted that a 
realistic understanding of the nature of scientific methodology 
“require[d] rejection” of the 1923 Frye27 case that announced the 
general acceptance test.28 She explained that the traditional 
test was “simplistic”29 and “incompatible with the essence of the 
scientific endeavor.”30 She wrote that the Frye test, if “taken 
literally[,] rejects valuable insights that bear all the hallmarks 
of acceptable science.”31 
Justice Blackmun supplanted the traditional standard 
with an essentially methodological test.32 He declared that the 
focus should be on the soundness of the scientific methodology 
supporting the expert’s opinion33 rather than the judge’s view of 
the correctness of the conclusion reached by the expert. The 
Justice elaborated that the opinion’s proponent must convince 
the trial judge that the opinion is “derived by the scientific 
method,”34 that is, “supported by appropriate validation.”35 
Those passages echoed the part of Professor Berger’s amicus 
brief in which she argued that 
[t]he question is not whether the judge agrees with the results of the 
study . . . . Rather the court must decide whether the study was set 
up and carried out in a manner that conforms to standards in the 
scientific community.36 
Professor Berger’s brief even anticipated the manner in 
which Justice Blackmun would rationalize his holding as a 
matter of statutory interpretation. He reasoned that “[t]he 
primary locus” for deriving the test was Rule 702.37 More 
specifically, he ruled that when marshaling testimony about 
  
 25 Id. at 589.  
 26 Id. at 588 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 27 See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).  
 28 Daubert Amicus Brief, supra note 11, at *2, *7. 
 29 Id. at 7.  
 30 Id.  
 31 Id.  
 32 Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Daubert Decision: Frye Is Dead, Long Live 
the Federal Rules of Evidence, TRIAL, Sept. 1993, at 60, 62-63.  
 33 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 595 (1993). 
 34 Id. at 590. 
 35 Id.  
 36 Daubert Amicus Brief, supra note 11, at *17; see also id. at *12 (“the 
methodology”). 
 37 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589.  
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the scientific methodology underpinning the expert’s opinion, 
the proponent must demonstrate the expert’s reasoning is 
reliable “scientific . . . knowledge” within the meaning of that 
expression in Rule 702.38 This was the identical statutory basis 
that Professor Berger’s brief singled out. Citing Rule 702, she 
stated that the trial judge ought to inquire whether the 
expert’s reasoning “conform[s] to the characteristics of 
‘scientific knowledge.’”39 
After announcing the general methodological test, 
Justice Blackmun proceeded to list several factors that trial 
judges should consider in deciding whether the expert’s opinion 
rests on sound scientific methodology.40 His list is quite similar 
to the list of such factors included in Professor Berger’s amicus 
brief. The Justice’s list includes these factors: 
• Whether the hypothesis is empirically testable;41 
• Whether it has been tested;42 
• Whether the research has been subjected to peer 
review (although he cautioned that peer review “is not 
a sine qua non of admissibility”);43 
• Whether the hypothesis is generally accepted to the 
extent that general acceptance is circumstantial 
evidence that other scientists have scrutinized the 
research and found it to be methodologically sound;44 
and 
• Whether the expert’s methodology has a known or 
ascertainable error rate.45 
The list in Professor Berger’s amicus is remarkably 
parallel: 
• Whether the theory “is capable of being proven false 
through observation or experimentation”;46 
• Whether the theory “has in fact been subjected to an 
empirical scrutiny”;47 
  
 38 Id. at 589-90 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 702). 
 39 Daubert Amicus Brief, supra note 11, at 11-12.  
 40 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-94.  
 41 Id. at 593. 
 42 Id. 
 43 Id. 
 44 Id. at 594. 
 45 Id.  
 46 Daubert Amicus Brief, supra note 11, at *13. 
 47 Id. at *14. 
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• Whether the research has been peer reviewed 
(although she cautioned that peer review should not 
be an invariable requirement);48 
• Whether the theory has been generally accepted to the 
extent that such acceptance is circumstantial proof 
that other scientists have concluded that the 
underlying research was “produced in conformity with 
the scientific process”;49 and 
• What the technique’s “error rate” is.50 
Professor Berger’s brief not only sketched the basic 
outline of Justice Blackmun’s opinion, it also furnished some of 
the fine print. After describing the validation test he derived 
from Rule 702, the Justice cited Rule 401 and added that to be 
relevant, the expert’s theory must “fit” the specific facts of the 
case.51 In her amicus brief, Professor Berger cited the same 
statute and emphasized that to satisfy Rule 401, the expert’s 
research has to “fit” the “facts in the case.”52 Procedurally, 
Justice Blackmun stressed that Federal Rule 104(a) governs 
the trial judge’s determinations under the validation test.53 
Professor Berger made precisely that point in her brief.54 In 
short, to a considerable extent, Professor Berger’s amicus brief 
presaged the content of Justice Blackmun’s opinion in Daubert. 
The coincidence is so extensive that the conclusion is well nigh 
unavoidable that her brief was a major influence on the 
Daubert Court’s decision.  
II. PROFESSOR BERGER’S AMICUS BRIEF IN KUMHO 
Six years after its Daubert decision, the Supreme Court 
revisited the topic of expert testimony in Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. 
v. Carmichael.55 Kumho raised the question of the standard for 
determining the admissibility of non-scientific expert 
testimony.56 As in Daubert, Professor Berger was the lead 
  
 48 Id. at *25-28. 
 49 Id. at *5-6. 
 50 Id. at *16-17.  
 51 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 587, 590-91 (1993) (citations 
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 52 Daubert Amicus Brief, supra note 11, at *11, n.11. 
 53 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592.  
 54 Daubert Amicus Brief, supra note 11, at *12.  
 55 526 U.S. 137 (1999).  
 56 Id. at 141. 
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author of an amicus brief in Kumho.57 Just as Justice 
Blackmun’s opinion in Daubert reflected the persuasiveness of 
her brief in that case, it is easy to discern the imprint of 
Professor Berger’s amicus brief on Justice Breyer’s opinion in 
Kumho. Professor Berger’s brief urged a balanced approach 
which Justice Breyer endorsed in his opinion. 
On the one hand, in her brief Professor Berger argued 
that the rigorous validation standard enunciated in Daubert 
was sometimes inappropriate for assessing the reliability of 
non-scientific expertise such as medical testimony.58 In his 
opinion, Justice Breyer concurred, observing that Daubert 
“referred only to ‘scientific’ knowledge” because “‘that [wa]s the 
nature of the expertise’ at issue” there.59 Elaborating, Professor 
Berger asserted that in a case involving non-scientific 
expertise, it would sometimes be wrong-minded to apply the 
factors enumerated in Daubert.60 Justice Breyer approved of 
that view in his opinion.61 
Next, Professor Berger generally cautioned against 
attempting to “construct a complex,” rigid classification system 
of types of expertise.62 The Justice agreed, stating that “it would 
prove difficult, if not impossible, for judges to administer 
evidentiary rules under which a gatekeeping obligation 
depended upon . . . distinction[s]” among various kinds of 
expert testimony.63 In his judgment, “conceptual efforts” to 
fashion such sharp distinctions were “unlikely to produce 
clear . . . lines capable of application in particular cases.”64 More 
specifically, Professor Berger asserted that, in at least some 
  
 57 Kumho Amicus Brief, supra note 12.  
 58 See id. at *4, *18.  
 59 Kumho Tire Co., 526 U.S. at 148 (alteration in original) (quoting Daubert 
v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 590 n.8 (1993)).  
 60 See Kumho Amicus Brief, supra note 12, at *4.  
 61 Kumho Tire Co., 526 U.S. at 150-51 (“We agree with the Solicitor General 
that ‘[t]he factors identified in Daubert may or may not be pertinent in assessing 
reliability, depending on the nature of the issue, the expert’s particular expertise, and 
the subject of his testimony.’ . . . [W]e can neither rule out, nor rule in, for all cases and 
for all time the applicability of the factors mentioned in Daubert, nor can we now do so 
for subsets of cases categorized by category of expert or by kind of evidence” (first 
alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Brief for the United States as Amicus 
Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 19, Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 
(1999) (No. 97-1709), 2002 WL 541947). 
 62 Kumho Amicus Brief, supra note 12, at *14.  
 63 Kumho Tire Co., 526 U.S. at 148.  
 64 Id.; see also id. at 151 (“We do not believe that Rule 702 creates a 
schematism that segregates expertise by type while mapping certain kinds of questions 
to certain kinds of experts.”).  
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instances, an expert’s experience could be an adequate 
foundation for an opinion.65 Justice Breyer also posited that a 
witness’s experience can be a sufficient basis for an expert 
opinion.66  
On the other hand, Professor Berger argued that the 
trial judge must demand that the expert’s proponent 
demonstrate that the expert’s opinion amounts to more than 
the witness’s “‘subjective belief.’”67 For his part, Justice Breyer 
came to the same conclusion.68 In her brief, Professor Berger 
asserted that “experience-based knowledge should not be 
automatically inadmissible . . . .”69 Likewise, Justice Breyer 
stressed that the trial judge must scrutinize even “experienced-
based testimony.”70 Professor Berger contended that the judge 
ought to insist that in preparing his or her testimony, the 
expert “exercis[ed] the same level of intellectual rigor that 
generally characterizes that expert’s field of expertise.”71 In 
formulating his holding, Justice Breyer echoed Professor 
Berger’s brief; he wrote that the trial judge must ensure that 
“an expert, whether basing testimony on professional studies or 
personal experience, employs in the courtroom the same level 
of intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert 
in the relevant field.”72 
In the final analysis, Professor Berger called on the 
Court to grant trial judges discretion both in applying Rule 
702’s substantive admissibility standard and in devising 
procedures for doing so. Substantively, Professor Berger 
recommended that the Court “accord the trial judge a 
substantial measure of discretion” in selecting the factors to be 
used in gauging the reliability of nonscientific expertise.73 She 
counseled against “bright-line test[s].”74 Procedurally, while 
  
 65 See Kumho Amicus Brief, supra note 12, at *6-7.  
 66 See Kumho Tire Co., 526 U.S. at 152.  
 67 Kumho Amicus Brief, supra note 12, at *13 (quoting Daubert v. Merrell 
Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 590 (1993))).  
 68 See Kumho Tire Co., 526 U.S. at 147-48 (“In Daubert, the Court specified 
that it is the Rule’s word ‘knowledge’ . . . that ‘establishes a standard of evidentiary 
reliability.’ Hence, as a matter of language, the Rule applies its reliability standard to 
all ‘scientific,’ ‘technical, or ‘other specialized’ matters within its scope.” (quoting 
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 589-90 & n.8 (1993)). 
 69 Kumho Amicus Brief, supra note 12, at *19.  
 70 Kumho Tire Co., 526 U.S. at 151.  
 71 Kumho Amicus Brief, supra note 12, at *3. 
 72 Kumho Tire Co., 526 U.S. at 152.  
 73 Kumho Amicus Brief, supra note 12, at *14.  
 74 Id. at *3.  
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some had asked the Court to recognize a right to a pretrial 
Daubert hearing, in her brief Professor Berger staked out the 
position that the trial judge should also have a significant 
measure of discretion in fashioning procedures for 
administering Rule 702.75 In his opinion, Justice Breyer came 
down on both issues in the same fashion. On the substantive 
question, the Justice stated that “in a particular case,” the trial 
judge has “broad latitude” in choosing the factors that are 
“reasonable measures of reliability.”76 Procedurally, the Justice 
declared: 
The trial court must have the same kind of latitude in deciding how 
to test an expert’s reliability, and to decide whether or when special 
briefing or other proceedings are needed to investigate 
reliability . . . . That standard applies as much to the trial court’s 
decisions about how to determine reliability as to its ultimate 
conclusion.77  
CONCLUSION 
It is fair to say that Daubert and Kumho are the two 
most important expert testimony opinions ever rendered by the 
United States Supreme Court. They not only control in federal 
court; they have been widely cited and followed by state courts 
as well.78 A comparison of those decisions with Professor Berger’s 
amicus briefs reveals a remarkable degree of similarity between 
the views she urged and the positions ultimately taken by the 
Court. At the very least, Professor Berger is an incredible 
prognosticator. More likely, though, her briefs were 
instrumental in convincing the Court to embrace those positions. 
By venturing beyond the “ivory tower” and joining the fray in 
Daubert and Kumho, Professor Berger helped shape two of the 
most important evidence decisions of this era. To a degree, her 
amicus briefs provided the Court with blueprints for those 
decisions, just as her distinguished career has become the 
blueprint for any member of the academy who aspires to take up 
the challenge of engaging in real world law reform. 
  
 75 See id. at *21-26; see also Berger, Procedural Paradigms for Applying the 
Daubert Test, supra note 2, at 1361-63. 
 76 Kumho Tire Co., 526 U.S. at 153; see also id. at 152 (“[A] trial court should 
consider the specific factors identified in Daubert where they are reasonable measures 
of the reliability of expert testimony.”).  
 77 Id. at 152 (emphasis omitted). 
 78 1 PAUL C. GIANNELLI & EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE § 
1.14 (4th ed. 2007). 
